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INTRODUCTION 
  
In times of crises, emergency first responders need an effective system of communication 
to notify the public, to organize evacuation, and to direct evacuees to shelters and hospitals 
around the affected areas. This research focuses on the “Reverse 911” alert system used by Santa 
Clara County and asks key questions about its efficiency: ‘Is it the only alert system used to 
communicate with the public during crises?’ ‘Is it a reliable tool?’ ‘Should Santa Clara County 
improve its emergency communication?’ ‘Can we be sure the community is notified on time and 
well directed to safety?’  
   The legislative intent of Reverse 911 was to notify County residents whenever they are 
at risk, from disaster, emergencies and crime, and to advise them of appropriate protective 
measures. Hence, the research question is: Does the process used for operating the Santa 
Clara County Reverse 911 System achieve the goal of providing timely and effective 
emergency notification to all members of the community? If not, what changes could 
enhance its operation? 
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Background Of Reverse 9 11 And Its Implementation In Santa Clara County: 
 
History of Alerting and Warning in the US 
 
 
What is alerting and warning? 
Emergency warning systems have past roots in civil defense, and the main reason why 
these systems were developed was to alert the public concerning a forthcoming threat over a 
given geographical area. In the era of the Cold War, the US developed an emergency 
broadcasting system known as CONELRAD, which used radio stations to broadcast any 
emergencies (After Action Report, 2007). Later this system was improved to become the 
Emergency Broadcasting System (EBS), and then the modern day Emergency Alert System 
(EAS). This was, for example, frequently used by safety organizations in San Diego to notify 
the public about adverse weather conditions, such as floods or tornados (After Action Report, 
2007).    
Given the escalating occurrence of natural disasters in the past two decades, it was 
important for the government to have a reliable emergency warning system so as to reach a 
large population within a short period when there is a disaster or an emergency (After Action 
Report, 2007). The Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) then was created in June, 
2006 as a merger of existing warning systems after the Hurricane Katrina disaster.  President 
George W. Bush signed an Executive Order to establish the new program to combine 
Emergency Alert System (EAS), National Warning System (NAWAS), Commercial Mobile 
Alert System (CMAS), and NOAA Weather Radio All Hazards. IPAWS was designed to 
integrate the different systems into one modern system and integrate newer forms of 
	  Evaluating the Reverse 911 System in Santa Clara County: Does the Process Work? 
 
	  
5	  
communications such as cellphones, SMS, satellite, radio, television and the Internet (FEMA, 
2014). 
The continued development of communication devices like mobile phones, PDAs and 
computers has advanced the manner in which emergency warnings are relayed. 
There has been a notable decline in death tolls resulting from natural disasters such as storms, 
tsunamis, cyclones and even fires. The modern day systems are computerized and they are 
designed to facilitate rapid message delivery using computer-programmed software. One of 
these newer systems is “Reverse 911” system (Barry, 2005). 
 
What is Reverse 911 and what is its purpose? 
 Reverse 911, called AlertSCC in Santa Clara County, is a community-based alerting system 
provided and owned by a for-profit company called Sigma Communications, Inc. (Reverse 911, 
2011). It is a registered trademark of a communication company known as Cassidian, an 
organization hired to communicate with people in defined geographical regions. This telephone 
company began the dispatching systems for telephones in 1960 (Strawderman et al., 2012). This 
system makes calls for the appropriate county agency for public safety, such as police, 
emergency management, public health, fire and sheriff. It is designed to notify the affected area 
of any emergency by sending a message through the phone system (Strawderman et al., 2012). 
Reverse 911 is also used to contact residents through phone lines in specific geographic areas 
to deliver alerts and urgent information when they are at risk (Reverse 911, 2011). The company 
selling this tool provides the computer systems, set up, and training, including Windows 2000, 
power-supply, printers and phones that are needed for the product to function (Reverse 911, 
	  Evaluating the Reverse 911 System in Santa Clara County: Does the Process Work? 
 
	  
6	  
2011). It requires specific arrangements with the phone service providers in the area and access 
to the phone number database. (Reverse 911, 2011).  
  However, unlisted numbers, cell phones and numbers on “no-call” lists are not included 
in the database unless manually added to the system (Martin, 2002). After installing the 
computer system, the county must choose how many phone lines it is expecting to use. The 
phone system functions by interacting with Geographic Information System (GIS), and 
Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) to deliver emergency notifications to assigned areas (Martin, 
2002). Before Reverse 911, emergency responders had to use other methods to contact residents, 
such as loudspeakers, sirens, weather radios, ‘telephone trees’ and sending law enforcement 
personnel to residents’ homes to deliver warning and safety instructions.  
 
How Reverse 911 Works and Where It Works  
  Reverse 911 is a computerized calling system that has the capacity to send thousands of 
messages, voice and text, in just a few minutes. It functions by first sending alert messages to 
‘landline’ phones, using the 411 (White Pages) and 911 (Emergency) databases. The system then 
sends these same messages to cell phones, laptops, desktop computers and any other electronic 
devices that has been registered with the Reverse 911 system, and that has telecommunication 
access (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009.)  
This alerting system in Santa Clara County covers 15 cities: Campbell, Cupertino, Gilroy, 
Los Altos, Los Altos Hills, Los Gatos, Milpitas, Monte Sereno, Morgan Hill, Mountain View, 
Palo Alto, San José, Santa Clara, Saratoga, Sunnyvale and the Unincorporated County (Mitchell 
& Anderson, 2009).  
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Implementation and expectations 
  Supervisor Ken Yeager first proposed this system “REVERSE 911” to the Board of 
Supervisors in 2007. He stated, “The range and flexibility of communication options to be 
offered will keep our residents safe and well-informed,” (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009).  
Meanwhile, the Santa Clara County FireSafe Council stated this on its website:  
“Where will you be when a disaster strikes? Whether Santa Clara County residents are at home, 
at work, at their children’s softball game or sitting in traffic on Highway 101, the new regional 
emergency notification system ‘AlertSCC’ will enable residents to receive timely and lifesaving 
information, no matter their location.” (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009).  
    Those were the expectations at the time of implementing this expensive system (see 
‘cost’ below), but today the question is: ‘Has Reverse 911 lived up to those expectations?’  
 
Cost of Alert SCC/ Reverse 911 
Santa Clara County is spending a substantial amount of money, given the initial purchase 
price, plus ongoing service and database management. Furthermore, this is in addition to the 
monthly and annual contracts with different telecommunications and data providers such as 
Verizon and AT&T (Wing, 2011). The total cost for a two-year agreement with the system 
provider company Blackboard Connect, Inc. (BCI) is $1,500,000. (FY 2012 cost of $750,000 
plus anticipated FY 2013 of $750,000) (Wing, 2011). The cost of the agreements with AT&T 
and Verizon for using 411/911 database records is $20,000. (FY 2012 of $10,000 plus 
anticipated FY 2013 of $10,000) (Wing, 2011).  
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   Previously, from September 2008 to September 2011, Santa Clara County had spent at 
least $4,380,000 (with BCI), covering that three-year period, equating to annual cost of 
$1,460,000. However, during the FY 2012 budget process, the Department negotiated with BCI 
to reduce the annual contract by almost 50% - to $750,000 (Wing, 2011).  Over five years, 2008 
– 2013, the total cost is more than six million dollars. 
 
This paper will discuss some of the communities that have used Reverse 911 as case 
studies. This will include Colorado fires in 2010, 2011 and 2012. The second case study will 
discuss San Diego Fires in 2003 where there was no Reverse 911 and compare it to San Diego 
fires in 2007 where Revere 911 was implemented and showed a great success. Then, the third 
case study will discuss an actual disaster using Alert SCC in Santa Clara County: Lehigh Cement 
Plant shooting in 2011. Was it the only emergency system used? Is Santa Clara keeping up to 
date with today’s social communication trends and change in technologies, such as social media 
and mobile technologies? Have social media tools been effectively employed, given that they are 
provided for free, easy to use and widely used by a large number of people?
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In recent years, the Reverse 911 alert system became popular among emergency 
management agencies and was adopted by many counties and cities around the United States. 
However, different case studies described it as either a failure or a success. Patrick Cassidy in 
The Cape Cod Times complained by saying, “Reverse 911 fails to alert Mass. residents of toxic 
smoke” (Cassidy, 2009). In contrast, a 2008 case study credits the successful application of 
Reverse 911 in saving lives from the 2007 wildfires in San Diego County (McKay, 2008). 
However, that particular study also explained that Reverse 911 was used in conjunction with 
another web based program, “WebEOC” which is a logistics management system used inside the 
EOC. This application enhanced the functionality of Reveerse 911 through connecting all 
emergency management parties together. WebEOC together with Reverse 911 helped to 
evacuate 500,000 people (McKay, 2008).  
   Accordingly, this research will examine if Santa Clara County uses, or should use, any 
other tools or methods in addition to the current “Reverse 911” system. However, given the 
present budget restrictions, fixing or replacing the current alerting programs could be challenging 
to emergency management officials. As noted, this mass alert system is expensive and has 
limited functionality; and yet the integration of multiple tools might help in addressing the 
failings that these systems have. Furthermore, there are different communication technologies 
emerging everyday. Many are available at minimum to no cost, and are widely used today by 
private and public sectors, such as social media tools and mobile apps. Before exploring the use 
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of these technologies, the limitations of Reverse 911 should be understood. 
 
Reverse 911’s trouble with Zip Codes 
Reverse 911 alerts people based on their zip codes. For example, if someone’s home is in 
Cupertino but their workplace is in San José, when a crisis happens in San José while they are 
working, they will not be notified. That will put them in potential danger. This is even worse 
than if people did not sign up in the first place, because this system is giving people a false sense 
of security, depending on a system that does not function as intended. A recent example is the 
‘cement plant shooter’ in Cupertino: although many people received reverse 911 calls warning 
them about an active shooter and advising them to stay indoors, there were others who were not 
alerted at all, even though they were less than a mile from the random shooting of a woman in 
the Hewlett-Packard lot on Homestead Road. (Newman, Fernandez, Gomez & Webby, 2011). So 
based on the registered zip-code of each phone, people were not identified as being in proximity 
to danger.  
 
 Insufficient Registration of the Population 
  The most pressing problem is that not enough people in the community are even aware of 
the system, let alone registered as Reverse 911 participants. One has to wonder what has been 
achieved thus far for six million dollars. In small sub-divisions of the population, such as 
business workforces and university student bodies, people are advised to register or even 
automatically registered. Meanwhile in the population at large, only listed landlines not on the 
“do not call” list are automatically registered, while cell-phones are not, unless these numbers 
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were manually registered. Furthermore, this lack of inclusion applies also to Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP), numbers not registered in the phone book, numbers registered on ‘no call lists’ 
(which blocks sales-calls) and those with caller ID blocking (Department of Homeland Security, 
2011). Multiple case studies also report a common flaw where some residents in an affected area 
received calls while others in the same area did not (Gorski & Brown, 2012). 
  
 Failure to act / Human error  
  Even in a case where everyone is registered to the system, there exists the possibility that 
the alerts will not even be activated, perhaps through negligence, inadequate staffing to issue the 
warning, an organizational disorder, or human error. An example of that is an incident at San 
José State University, where students and faculty members were not notified on time about a 
shooter in the 10th Street Garage. This put them at risk and left everyone confused and anxious; 
the dispatcher had been so busy, that he failed to send the notification (KTVU, 2011).  
 
 Language barriers  
Language limitation is another major issue with Reverse 911, given that the Bay Area is a 
diverse community. As stated in the AlertSCC frequently asked questions (FAQ) page, 
“messages are only sent in English. We hope to enhance AlertSCC in the future” (AlertSCC, 
2013). – and yet the website itself is in four different languages.  
On the other hand, someone using Social Media can publish a warning message in many 
other languages. According to Facebook statistics, it supports more than 70 languages globally 
(Facebook, 2011), and many social media tools include a translation feature, so if someone does 
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not speak English, he/she can set the tools to automatically translate a message into his primary 
language.  
 
 Over reliance on a ‘land based’ system  
Another flaw with Reverse 911 is that it is land based, which imposes a great risk of 
losing communication as a result of a large natural disaster, such as flood or earthquake. This 
lesson was learned from Hurricane Katrina when land communications were completely lost 
except for text messaging (Committee on Energy and Commerce, 2005).  
  In a similar case, Reverse 911 would need to have a viable and alternative back up, a part 
of which could perhaps be the use of social media. It should be noted nonetheless that there are 
concerns that come with using social media communication. Some case studies address these 
concerns, such as generational gaps given that not everyone knows how to use these tools, or 
even knows what social media tools are. Other concerns include accuracy of information, the 
right to privacy and the protection of personal safety.  
After exploring the limitations of Reverse 911, the concern is how to improve this system 
in the most cost effective way? What are Social Media tools and how would they contribute in 
improving the current alerting system? 
 
Social Media 
Social media tools are internet-based applications that large numbers of people use today. 
They communicate with each other, share information and exchange resources. There are many 
examples of social media: Blogger, MySpace, Wiki, YouTube, Twitter, LinkedIn, and Facebook, 
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where Twitter and Facebook are the most popular. These social media tools can be accessed by 
laptops, desktops, smart phones (phones with internet access) and other hand-held devices such 
as iPads.  
The use of social media is widespread and is becoming more popular since it is easy to 
use and available for free (Lindsay, 2011). In 2009, a study conducted by the American Red 
Cross revealed that social media websites were fourth among sources used to access emergency 
information (Lindsay, 2011). Today it is used even more extensively.  
The private sector noticed the benefits of using social media to increase public outreach 
early on. For example, during the Icelandic volcano eruption crisis, airlines’ call centers used 
social media to communicate with customers as a crisis plan to respond to requests and 
questions. KLM’s CEO published a video message on Facebook and used Twitter to send 
updates about cancellations, re-booking and links to more detailed information (Tobin, 2010). 
Lufthansa also used Twitter to reduce calls by redirecting customers to alternative resources 
(Tobin, 2010). 
 
The public sector and social media  
       Social media is widely used publicly for many purposes, such as advocating political 
change, supporting social causes and fundraising. But more importantly, in the context of this 
research, cities and counties are making social media an integral part of their emergency 
management strategy. Social media has already many information sharing features, such as text, 
pictures and videos, whereas other traditional emergency systems are still developing and trying 
to adopt similar features, such as ‘Next Generation 911’ (Swallow, 2011). 
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 Other advanced features include mapping and directions tools such as GPS, Map Quest 
and Google Maps that were all combined to create the “who-what-where-when” in one real-time 
feature, such as “Check In” used by Facebook and some other social media tools. This feature 
helps people in one person’s network to find his location by providing them with a map and 
address whenever he “checks in” to a certain spot. This feature can be adopted for organizing 
rescue teams during and after a crisis as an alternative method in case current methods fail.  
Overall, these tools can reach everyone who has a functional cell phone, and has signed 
in to the emergency social media tool. These applications can be very useful during emergency 
situations, since most people do not leave their homes without having their cell phones in hand.  
 
 Santa Clara County’s use of Social Media  
  Santa Clara Emergency Services created a ‘Facebook Group’ in April 2010, but it lacks 
visibility. A year after its creation there had been only 455 people ‘signed in’ (April 2011). That 
number increased to only 506 people in Oct 2012, and up to a total of only 660 people in Oct 
2014. At the same time they also created a YouTube channel called ‘AlertSCC’ at 
http://www.youtube.com/user/alertscc. The only activity on this site was on April 15th, 2010 
when two informational videos were posted to encourage people to register. Since then these 
videos have been viewed a mere 2,498 times in a county of 1.6 million people, and the channel 
has only nine subscribers listed on October 24, 2012. This number increased by only one more 
subscriber, for a total of ten subscribers as of October 22, 2014. As yet there has been no sign of 
employing any other social media tools such as Twitter or Blog, or better advertising the 
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availability of the existing tools. This represents an extremely minimal web and social media 
presence.  
 
 General Observations 
Based on initial research, the use of Reverse 911 reveals many imperfections and gaps, 
some within the tool itself, some in the way it is implemented. It is clearly beneficial to have a 
more complete and modern set of communication tools working together. Santa Clara Office of 
Emergency Services needs to reconsider the current system, since different studies and incidents 
reveal that Reverse 911 has many gaps that make it unreliable during critical times. It needs to 
revaluate its efficiency in reaching a wider audience. Also, the public needs to be aware of the 
system. That being said, Santa Clara Office of Emergency Services needs to expand its 
communication methods by effectively including social media as a current and low cost addition. 
Social media need to be actively used in combination with older communication methods 
(telephone, television, radio). As Craig Fugate, the FEMA Administrator, said, “We’re here to 
support the survivors . . . they shouldn’t have to fit our system, we should fit how they 
communicate, with the tools they’re using” (Zurer, 2011).  
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METHODOLOGY 
 
This research used three main approaches:  literature review, case studies of the 
application of Reserve 911 in actual events, and benchmarking against the San Diego system’s 
functionality in 2007. 
 Case studies addressed in this paper were used to analyze the effectiveness of Reverse 
911 in past disasters. These case studies included Colorado fires, San Diego fires and a case 
study in Santa Clara County. The last one addressed the process and implementation of Reverse 
911 during the Lehigh Cement Plant shootings on October 5, 2011.  
  Case study research was conducted through observation and analysis of reports from past 
events. This helped with exploring and understanding complex issues, especially where an 
investigation is needed.  
The case study approach enables the researcher to go beyond quantitative and statistical 
data and to understand the behavioral situations. It is mostly used in government, management 
and in education research (Yin, 2009). There are three main categories of case studies, as 
described by Yin (Yin, 2009): exploratory, descriptive and explanatory. This research exploits all 
three approaches to identify the reasons and circumstances that led to success or failure in each 
case. For example, in the Lehigh Cement Plant shootings, the questions asked included: Did the 
process achieve the goal of the program? What is the process used for notifying the community? 
What kinds of events trigger notifications? Did the implementation succeed? Who was notified? 
When were they notified? Where did the last murder occur and why did people in the area not 
receive notification?  
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 This paper also analyzed San Diego before implementing Reverse 911 and after by 
comparing 2003 fires vs. October 2007 fires. 
Finally, the various cases demonstrate the functionality of Reverse 911 in actual events 
that can be evaluated for similarity to circumstances in Santa Clara County. San Diego County is 
similar in size and demographics to Santa Clara County, so its experience with Reverse 911 
during the 2007 fires provides a useful benchmark against which to measure the performance of 
the system locally.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
Prior Research done by Santa Clara County before Implementing Reverse 911  
According to research conducted by the county prior to implementing Reverse 911, the 
results showed that the system is effective in alerting people and saving their lives from potential 
danger (Lohse, 2007).  
The system is designed to provide efficiency and speed. While implementing this system, 
one of the most important things to consider was speed. The system infrastructure had to be 
designed in such a way that it could send thousands of messages in a single order. In addition, 
the messages had to be efficient in that no jam or crush would be expected. By using the system, 
police, fire fighters, and rescuers should be able to send out messages that warn the public of any 
upcoming hazard or disasters.  
The decision to implement the system was brought about by various concerns regarding 
the safety of the county’s residents.  Prior to implementing the system, one of the main concerns 
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was how to get all the people added to the system’s database in order to notify them as fast as 
possible in case of any danger and to prevent future loss of lives. However, to make sure that 
happened, residents had to register with the system.  
The research done for implementing the system had proven at that time that Reverse 911 
had the potential to save lives in case of an emergency (Lohse, 2007). During the first tryouts, 
the system developers had to ensure that it met the needs of the county residents. First and 
foremost, the county officials considered the ability of the system to make an impact in saving 
lives. Findings of that research showed that the system is sustainable and effective to include a 
large number of people (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009). Santa Clara County has almost 1.8 million 
people (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009). Most of the research done prior to implementing the 
system was to see whether it had the capacity to reach county residents in a timely fashion. The 
system proved to be effective then, since it was fast in delivering alert messages in case of any 
emergency (Lohse, 2007).  
In addition, the research showed that the system is flexible in terms of increasing or 
changing the number of people who would be notified in case of an emergency. This was 
important since the system would continuously need to be updated and designed in a particular 
manner to cover different numbers of residents and businesses (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009).  
Research results also showed that the system was easy to handle, as the system did not 
need a lot of maintenance and it was self-maintained (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009). However, 
deficiencies were discovered. For example, the system had the probability of having a 
malfunction in times of a disaster (Martin, 2002), because of the large number of messages that 
had to be delivered within a short time span  (Santa Clara County, 2008). The decision was made 
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to implement the system anyway for the sake of the public safety.  The county executive 
endorsed at as the best option available (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009).  
Different methods have been employed to encourage the residents to register with the 
system. For instance, public seminars were held to motivate people to register, and public 
officials have been quoted as supporting public participation in publicity pieces (Mitchell & 
Anderson, 2009). In addition, the County Office of Emergency Services, which is responsible for 
educating the public about the system, has developed different advertisements to notify the 
residents (Cassidy, 2009). The registration process has been made simple so that everyone can 
register online. This has made it possible for more citizens to enroll in the system. However, with 
all these efforts, many people still never heard of Reverse 911 and they are not aware that they 
need to take the initiative to register their various communications devices to the system.  
 
Case Studies 
  Case studies have assessed where Reverse 911 succeeded or failed during a certain 
disaster in different cities in the United States. This paper will be addressing 2010, 2011 and 
2012 Colorado wildfires, 2003 and 2007 San Diego Wildfires and the 2011 Lehigh Cement 
Plant shootings in Santa Clara County. These case studies will evaluate circumstances 
surrounding the use of Reverse 911, including time of the disaster, area affected, number of 
victims, scale of the damage, evacuees, emergency tools or systems used beside Reverse 911, 
response teams, response time and the database source used for Reverse 911.  
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A. Colorado Fires Case Study: 2010, 2011 and 2012 
 
2010 fires:  
In 2010, Colorado experienced one great wildfire known as the Fourmile Canyon Fire, 
and it continued for eleven days (Spotts, 2010). This fire destroyed approximately 6,181 acres 
and 169 homes (Spotts, 2010). This fire was declared the worst in Colorado history, until the 
Waldo Canyon fire surpassed it, in June of 2012 (Muskal, 2012). Summery of 2010 Colorado 
fires:  
Name of 
Fire 
 
Year 
 
Cause 
Acres 
burned 
Homes 
destroyed 
 
Deaths 
 
Evacuation 
 
County 
Fourmile 
Canyon 
2010 
Sep 6 
May have been 
caused by a vehicle 
striking a propane 
tank according to 
Investigators 
 
 
 
6181 
169 
homes, 
5+ 
structure 
 
 
 
0 
3,500 people have 
been evacuated 
from about 1,000 
homes 
 
 
Boulder 
SOURCE: Spotts, 2010; Muskal, 2012. 
 
When looking at the effectiveness of the Reverse 911, in 2010 the system failed because 
of human error, flawed data and a blemished effort to get citizens without landlines to register 
their cell phones. The failure of Reverse 911 in 2010 led to confusion among the rescuers 
because they did not know who was not notified yet and which areas were still not completely 
evacuated.  
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2011 Fires: 
In 2011, Colorado experienced separate wildfires between the months of March and June, 
where in April it witnessed just one wildfire, while in June it witnessed six wildfires (Coffman, 
2011). In 2011, there were eleven wild fires, but they were not as serious as those of 2012. These 
11 wildfires, which happened between the months of March and June, affected the Boulder, 
Jefferson, Larimer, Las Animas, Teller and Fremont counties (CNN, 2011).  
Summery of 2011 Colorado fires: 
Name of 
Fire 
 
Year 
 
Cause 
Acres 
burned 
Homes 
destroyed 
 
Deaths 
 
Evacuation 
 
County 
Lefthand 
Canyon 
2011 
Mar Human 622 
 
0 
 
0 200 + homes 
Boulder 
County 
Indian 
Gulch 
2011 
Mar unknown 1,570 
 
0 
 
0 
 
100 homes Jefferson 
Crystal 2011 Apr 
Human 
 3,200 13 0 
24 homes 
 Larimer 
Bear 2011 May Lightning 6,885 
 
2 0 0 
Las 
Animas 
Purgatoire 2011 May Unknown 6,140 0 0 0 
Las 
Animas 
Navajo 2011 June Unknown 57 0 0 104 homes Teller 
 
Shell 
2011 
June Lightning 
 
27,792 7 0 0 
Las 
Animas 
Brice 2011 June Lightning 
 
4,690 0 0 0 
Las 
Animas 
Mesa 
DaMaya 
2011 
June Lightning 
 
13,312 0 0 0 
Las 
Animas 
Duckett 2011 June Unknown 156 0 0 
The Rainbow Trail 
Lutheran Camp 
and Eagle Peak 
Subdivision have 
been evacuated 
Custer/Fr
emont 
Track 2011 June Human 329 8 0 40 homes 
Las 
Animas 
SOURCE: Coffman, 2011; CNN, 2011. 
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2012 fires: 
 In 2012, Colorado experienced separate fires that took place between the months of June 
and July. These fires each covered vast areas, thus affecting many individuals.  
 The Little Sand Fire was a 22,400-acre fire and was located in San Juan National Forest 
(Solution, 2012). The Treasure Fire of 2012 that burned around 420 acres was located in Lake 
County (Solution, 2012). The Weber Fire burned approximately 10,000 acres in Montezuma 
County. This fire led to evacuation orders for 140 households, and 390 more received pre-
evacuation orders (Solution, 2012).  
The Waldo Canyon fire, also of 2012, started ten miles northwest of Colorado Springs 
and was contained on 15,365 acres of United States Forest Service land (Muskal, 2012). This fire 
led to the evacuation of about 32,000 residents of Woodland Park, Colorado Springs and 
Manitou Springs, and it partially evacuated the U.S Air Force Academy (Crawford, 2012). By 
the time firefighters overcame the fire, it had already destroyed over 350 homes, making it the 
most destructive in Colorado state history. There was also the High Park fire that happened in 
June 2012.  The inferno torched over 87,000 acres, leaving one person dead and destroying 259 
homes (Muskal, 2012).  
Finally, the Flagstaff fire happened in July of 2012, in Boulder County and it was 
contained after it had burned about 300 acres (The Gazette, 2012). In June 2012, these Colorado 
forest fires were declared federal disasters. Summary of 2012 Colorado fires: 
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Name of 
Fire 
 
Year 
 
Cause 
Acres 
burned 
Homes 
destroyed 
 
Deaths 
 
Evacuation 
 
County 
Lower 
North Fork 
2012 
Mar 26 
By embers 
from a 
prescribed fire 
4,140 23  3 900 homes 
Jefferson 
County 
Little Sand 2012, May 13 Lightning 
22,400-
acre 0 0 0 Archuleta 
High Park 2012,  June 9  Lightning 
Over 
87,250 
acres 
259 1 Thousands of people were evacuated 
Larimer 
County 
Springer 2012, June 17  Human 
Over 
1,100 
acres 
22 houses 
and two 
outbuildings 
 More than 200 residents Park County 
Treasure June 21 Human 420 acres 0 0 0 Lake County 
Weber 2012, 
June 22 Human 
Over 
10,000 0 0 140 households 
Montezum
a County 
Waldo 
Canyon 
2012, 
June 23 Human 
 
Over 
15,364 
350 homes  
Over 32,000 residents of 
Colorado Springs, Manitou 
Springs, Woodland Park, 
several small mountain 
communities along 
Highway 24 & partial 
evacuation of the United 
States Air Force Academy 
El Paso 
County 
Woodland 
Heights 
fire 
June 23, 
2012 
Started by 
electric line 
rubbed against 
a tree 
 
 
27.3 
22 homes 
and two 
outbuildings 
0 
Evacuation ordered from 
High Drive west to the 
Rocky Mountain National 
Park border  
Larimer 
County 
Last 
Chance 
Fire 
June 25, 
2012 
Thought to be 
sparks thrown 
up from a car 
wheel after a 
tire blowout 
 
Over 
45,000 
11 structures 
& 4 homes 0 25 residents at least 
Washingto
n County 
Flagstaff 
(Bison) 
fire 
 
June 26 
 
Lightning About 300 0 0 26 households 
Boulder 
County 
Pine 
Ridge fire 
June 27, 
2012 Lightning 
13,920 
acres 
Burned 3 
empty tents 
and 
campers 
0 
Evacuation order issued 
for the areas of east of I-
70, west of 45 1/2 Road, 
and south of U Road. 
Mesa 
County 
Ironing 
Board fire 
June 28, 
2012 Lightning 
Around a 
tenth of 
an acre 
0 0 0 Boulder County 
SOURCE: Solution, 2012; Muskal, 2012; Crawford, 2012; The Gazette, 2012. 
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Colorado has had mixed results from the use of a Reserve 911 system for community 
alerting during wildland fires. Authorities acknowledged that twelve percent of the people 
affected by the wildland fire of 2012 never got the Reverse 911 call giving them a warning to 
evacuate. A misconception about this notification system left some fire evacuees from Waldo 
Canyon waiting for the emergency call that never came (The Gazette, 2012). Some people had 
already packed and were waiting for the emergency call telling them to evacuate. This 
misconception is that, if your landline is listed with the telephone company’s directory there is 
no need to register in order to receive an emergency call.  Unfortunately, this was not the case 
because some landlines were automatically listed in the Reverse 911 databases, while others 
were not. The spokesperson for the agency managing the notification system said that they are 
evaluating the phone listing failure. Individuals are advised to manually list their contact 
information to ensure that it is available to the Reverse 911 system (USATODAY, 2012). 
The suggestion has been made that the Reverse 911 system is culpable for the deaths in 
the 2012 fires because it did not notify everyone in the fire endangered areas (Gabbert, 2012). It 
appears that the public was not adequately educated on the workings of the system and the need 
to register multiple devices to ensure that warning messages could be received (USATODAY, 
2012). The providing company’s website, Cassidian, stated: “REVERSE 911® system is ideal 
for use in small towns and villages, as well as small to mid-sized municipalities, school 
campuses, Federal agencies and military bases.” (Cassidian Communications, 2012). After the 
Colorado fires of March 2012, Cassidian, the communication dispatching company, pointed out 
that it was not its fault that Reverse 911 failed to notify everyone in the affected region. It 
justified its position by explaining that the system was not designed to handle large populations. 
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It described Reverse911 by saying: “it is only one component of an overall public safety 
communications strategy. During emergencies like the Colorado wildfire, information should be 
disseminated through multiple outlets and residents should always seek out information from as 
many reliable sources as possible.” (Cassidian Communications, 2012).  
It should be noted that the 2012 Colorado wildfire was far worse than the previous ones 
in 2010 and 2011. This massive fire, helped by winds and hot weather, destroyed many homes 
and forced vast numbers of people to flee. The crews battling this deadly fire ranked it as the 
most destructive wildfire in the history of the state.  
It is also important to bear in mind other factors that could have influenced the 
effectiveness of the emergency response during these events, such as time of the disaster, 
location and how destructive that fire was. As we have seen, Colorado’s wildfires did not take 
place at exactly the same time of each year. These fires varied in time and location and were 
hardly predictable.  
When analyzing the number of victims and the amount of destruction resulting from 
these fires, one can see that the 2012 wildfire had the most victims. This fire destroyed 259 
homes, and one elderly couple was found dead in their home (Muskal, 2012).  This is by far, the 
highest number of houses destroyed by the Colorado fires in these three years. In 2011, there are 
no reports of any destroyed structures or homes, and according to this research, there were no 
reports of any victims. However, in 2010, the 6181-acre inferno burned down 169 homes and 
displaced vast numbers of residents of Boulder County (Spotts, 2010). The 2012 wildfire forced 
over 35,000 people to flee their homes and destroyed many of these homes, while that of 2011 
led to the evacuation of 9,500 homes on the southeastern side of Denver, and that of 2010 caused 
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individuals from 169 homes to start from scratch because their homes were completely destroyed 
(CNN, 2011). Before 2010, there had never been such an expensive wildfire in Colorado, which 
was estimated at $217 million (Spotts, 2010).  
Currently, the State Forest Service of Colorado is the lead agency for suppressing 
wildfires. They use a system of updating the public about the current and possible future 
wildfires on their website. The other system that is in use is the fire danger rating system. They 
use this system to manage elements of wildfire-associated risks and come up with fire danger 
predictions. It provides a number of indices, which portray potential and current fire danger 
conditions. Additionally, the emergency notifications are announced in the local radio stations. 
However, various agencies assist them in doing this job. These include the Division of 
Emergency Management, the Military and Veterans Affairs Department, and the Department of 
Public Safety. The duties of the Emergency Management Division are to prepare, prevent, 
mitigate, and respond. The other responsibility of this department is resource mobilization. On 
the other hand, the Military and Veterans Affairs Department participates in efforts to suppress 
the fire only when requested and these requests come only after all the other resources have been 
overwhelmed. Finally, the Department of Public Safety’s mission is to ensure the security and 
safety of Colorado through uniting powers with local, state, tribal and federal partners in order to 
protect against, prevent, recover from and respond to all hazards. This agency does not have 
direct wildfire suppression responsibility or capability. It offers voluntary certification and 
training of locally organized firefighters. Also, it is responsible for keeping up the emergency 
resource mobilization plan for the state and resource database that are used to send resources to 
any large-scale incidents, such as the Colorado wildfires. 
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The Reverse 911 uses the 911 database of each county as the source for telephone 
numbers, and it is able to process about 2000 phone numbers in a minute (Chandler, 2010). This 
system works with all telephones with a Telecommunications Device for the Deaf line, which is 
an electronic device that provides text communication through a telephone line used by 
individuals with speech or hearing difficulties. It also has a feature for callback, which ensures 
that the message is delivered. The published and non-published numbers for “landlines” are 
dialed, and this system leaves a message if the answering machine picks up. For the Reverse 911 
system to call a VOIP phone or cell phone, a person must register his/her number with the 
authority board of 911 (Chandler, 2010).  
 
Lessons Learned From the Colorado Fires 
Everybody should register their telephones with the Reverse 911 notification system in order 
to ensure that the number is in the system. It is also important to update telephone numbers more 
regularly and send residents postcards reminding and encouraging them to register their mobile 
numbers. Regular outreach practices are important to ensure getting more residents to register 
their contact information so they can receive those emergency messages.  Residents who rely on 
Reverse 911 should be forewarned that this system might not work, and to treat it only as one of 
many warning tools. It is advisable for an individual to always use multiple information sources 
when in an emergency to ensure the ability to evacuate before the danger approaches.  
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B. San Diego Wildfires Case Study  
 
San Diego 2003 Fires  
The conditions that set a backdrop for the destructive fire of 2003 in San Diego included 
a dry spell that lasted for a long period of time in Lindbergh Airfield and Los Angeles (Service 
Assessment, 2004). Los Angeles had not received a measurable amount of rain for a long time 
and heat slowly began to engulf the area, after which wildfires sprung up (Service Assessment, 
2004). The Grand Prix-Padua Fire, which was the first major fire in southern California that 
year, began on October 21, 2003. This fire consumed 60,000 acres in San Bernardino County 
and over 10,000 acres in Los Angeles County, and destroyed 135 homes (After Action Report, 
2007). With the prevailing weather conditions of low humidity and light winds, high pressure 
mounted in the south. This led to a sustained period of Santa Ana winds. The wind first passed 
over high mountain canyons on October 24/25 but later it spread to the lower altitudes starting 
from October 25 until the afternoon of October 27 (Service Assessment, 2004). On October 26, 
the Santa Ana wind had reached peak intensity and led to the onset of the deadliest fires, the 
Cedar Fire (Service Assessment, 2004).  
The source of this fire was an accidental flare from a lost hiker. It spread rapidly due to 
the prevailing conditions. The Santa Ana wind was traveling at 60 mph and there was less than 
10% minimum humidity along with the dreadfully dry fuel, this created good conditions for the 
fire to spread (Service Assessment, 2004). On Sunday night, October 26, the Cedar Fire spread 
for a distance of over 30 miles to the western and southern parts, places that were densely 
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populated. During this phase there were 13 fatalities and over 2000 residential structures 
damaged. On October 30, the last casualty, a firefighter was killed. The worst area affected was 
the Scripps Ranch community, where over 150 homes were destroyed (Service Assessment, 
2004) – and this had led to the ignition of uncontrollable fires on October 25th and 26th (Service 
Assessment, 2004).  
The Simi Fire had ravaged over 100,000 acres before firefighters could contain it. During 
this fire, 990 homes were ruined and six people lost their lives (After Action Report, 2007). The 
Paradise Fire was less destructive as it burned 57,000 acres, destroying over 200 residences and 
two people lost their lives (Service Assessment, 2004). The Otay Fire started October 26 during 
the Santa Ana wind event. It burned 46,291acers and destroyed one home.  
By late Monday, October 27 the weather pattern began to change drastically as the 
Eastern pressure gradient fell, leading to the relaxation of Santa Ana winds (After Action Report, 
2007). On Tuesday, October 28, an onshore flow from southern California and strong western 
winds caused the fires to spread to the east up the mountain slope (After Action Report, 2007). 
The November favorable temperatures created a leeway for the fire fighters to contain the 
wildfire. In this event, 22 people lost their lives, 225 were injured and almost 740,000 acres of 
forest and urban area were burned within a period of few days (Service Assessment, 2004). The 
cost appended to fighting this fire was estimated at $121 million, and structural losses amassed 
up to $2 billion dollars (After Action Report, 2007). Over 3,600 residences, 1,169 outbuildings 
and 36 commercial buildings were destroyed (After Action Report, 2007). Summary of 2003 San 
Diego fires: 
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SOURCE: After Action Report, 2007;	  Service Assessment, 2004.	  
 
 San Diego 2007 Wild Fires  
These San Diego County Firestorms started on the 21st day of October 2007 near the 
U.S./Mexico border at 9:30 Pacific Standard Time (PST) (After Action Report, 2007). For a long 
period of time, the fire burned all the way through San Diego County and finally was contained 
on November 9, 2007(Chris, 2008). The first fire to hit the ground was the Harris Fire, which 
began at Highway 94 and Harris Ranch Road near Potrero, in the southern part of San Diego 
County. This fire was fiercely raging and burned northwest towards eastern Chula Vista, causing 
the safety organizations to order a mandatory evacuation of the people who lived in that area 
(After Action Report, 2007). By the time the Harris Fire was contained it had consumed around 
90,000 acres of land (Robin,2008). 
The Witch Creek Fire was the second fire, commencing just a few hours after the Harris 
Fire in the Witch Creek Canyon (After Action Report, 2007). The fire was rampant and spread 
 
Name of 
Fire 
 
 
Cause 
 
Acres 
burned 
 
Homes 
destroyed 
 
 
Deaths 
 
People 
evacuated 
 
Response -
Evacuation  
 
Cedar 
 
Human 
 
273,246  
 
2,232  
 
14 
 
56,000 people  
Midnight.  
Warnings started 
early morning 
 
Otay 
 
 
Un-determined 
 
 
46,291 
 
1 
 
None 
 
None 
Law enforcement 
personnel 
knocking on doors 
and notifying 
residents from 
loudspeakers 
 
 
Paradise 
 
Human 
 
56,700 
 
221 
 
2 
 
Yes 
 
Simi Unknown 100,000 990 6 Yes 
Grand Prix-
Padua  
  
70,000  
 
135  
 
None 
 
Yes 
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quickly to Poway, Rancho Bernardo, Ramona and Escondido. The prevailing winds were 
moving at a speed of more than 100 miles per hour. As a result, the fire ‘jumped’ over some 
places and continued to ravage the wild forest going towards the West. This fire burned 197,990 
acres, which made it the largest wildfire in the year 2007 (After Action Report, 2007).  
The third fire to ravage San Diego County was the Rice Canyon Fire, which started the 
next day, October 22nd. It burned a total of 9,472 acres leading to mandatory evacuations of 
thousands of people living in the northern part of the San Diego County (After Action Report, 
2007). On the same day the Poomacha Fire, which commenced as a structure fire on the La Jolla 
Indian reservation, quickly extended to Palomar Mountain where it joined the Witch Creek Fire 
and spread to the Tibia Wilderness (Robin, 2008). As a result, 49,410 acres were burned. The 
fire was finally contained on November 9th (Robin, 2008). 
The 2007 fires led to 10 fatalities, while 23 people suffered fire injuries. Out of the 
62,000 firefighters, only 89 sustained minor injuries (After Action Report, 2007). The total land 
consumed by the fire was 368,340 acres, and it is estimated that over 1,600 homes, 239 vehicles, 
253 structures, 800 outbuildings and 2 commercial properties were totally destroyed in the fire 
(After Action Report, 2007). This fire was contained through the coordinated activities of over 
6,000 fire fighters. During this time nearly 90% of the San Diego county public schools were 
closed and many businesses too (After Action Report, 2007). Freeways were shut down and the 
inhabitants were recommended to avoid using the roads for some time. Fighting the San Diego 
wildfires in 2007 was exceedingly successful as compared to the 2003 firestorms where massive 
damage was incurred, including loss of lives and bodily injuries. It was estimated that the 
damages caused by the Poomacha, Rice Canyon, Harris, and Witch Creek fires could amount to 
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$41.3 million (After Action Report, 2007). However, one salient feature of this firefighting 
episode is that 515,000 county residents received voluntary and mandatory evacuation notices, 
which helped them to run to safety (Robin, 2008). As a result, the U.S witnessed a very 
successful robust system of containing emergencies as demonstrated in containing the 2007 fires.   
Summary of 2007 San Diego fires: 
 
SOURCE: After Action Report, 2007;	  Robin, 2008.	  
 
Comparing San Diego 2003 Fires before Implementing Reverse 911 and after Implementing In 
2007  
During the 2003 fires, there were no disaster preparation measures that included a united 
work of all the parties involved in evacuating the affected areas. Moreover, there was no 
systematic way of notifying the residents, for example that a fire was starting, hence there was a 
high level of fatalities, injuries and losses in the 2003 fires compared to the San Diego’s 2007 
firestorms. In 2007, residents were continually given notifications on what was happening 
Name of Fire  
Cause 
Acres 
burned 
 
Homes 
destroyed 
 
Deaths 
 
People 
evacuated 
 
Response- 
Evacuation  
 
Rice Canyon 
 
Human/ 
Electrical  
 
9,472 
 
248 
 
0 
Mandatory 
evacuations, 
29,000 people 
evacuated 
 
 
Law 
enforcement, fire 
officials, Reverse 
911, Alert San 
Diego, WebEOC 
System, 211, 
television and 
radio media. 
 
Poomacha Structure fire 45,000 136 0 Reverse 911 
used to contact 
residents to 
evacuate  
Harris Unknown 86,500 206 5 Mandatory 
evacuations, 
5400 people 
evacuated 
Witch Creek Power lines 197,990 1,040 2 Mandatory 
evacuations. 
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through different media outlets, like journals, web sites and television. In this way, those who 
had lost touch with their family members were able to reunite (Bret, 2007). Through the Reverse 
911 system, GIS maps were available for use by the JIC and they were therefore important for 
the media fraternity and the residents of the effected area.  
Reverse 911, during the 2007 San Diego wildfires, was used with other various channels 
of disseminating information, and these included 211, the county web sites, Web EOC and 
Email. These channels helped the safety organizations to ensure that information was readily 
available to the right parties at the right time (Dian, 2007). Reverse 911 provided GIS images to 
the ICS chain of command within the Operational Area EOC (OAEOC) to make sure that the 
whole team worked in unison with similar objectives. The centralized command allowed the GIS 
staff to achieve much in a short period (Dian, 2007).  
  After Reverse 911 was implemented in San Diego, there was a notable cooperation 
between the OAEOC GIS staff and Federal and State agencies. In the past, these groups worked 
as separate entities and this led to conflicts in interest leading to wasted time, which translated to 
more losses. This union helped the OAEOC GIS staff to make use of technologies that were 
previously preserved for the military and the intelligence of the government (Chris, 2008). 
Reserve 911 created a leeway for Google and NASA to chip in their help, in obtaining 
live images that the OAEOC needed, so as to set the right parameters on how to contain the fires 
(Dian, 2007). Reverse 911 pre mapped the special needs facilities and this helped in the 2007 
fires, whereby 2,100 people were evacuated (Chris, 2008). Moreover, the OAEOC was able to 
access the GIS maps and imagery through the San Diego State University website. As a result, 
the public was updated continually (After Action Report, 2007). The evacuation areas were 
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mapped using the Reverse 911 text information and this created a platform for the city, county 
and federal agencies to render their help in the most critical time. Through the Reverse 911 
system the county, state and GIS staff were able to access WebEOC enabling them to view, post 
and share geospatial information (Chris, 2008).  
The main attribute of this system is that it allows the recipients to reply with a 
confirmation message stating that they have received the warning. Because of this, safety 
workers are aware of people who might not have been informed (After Action Report, 2007).  
In 2007, the safety organization successfully managed to evacuate over 500,000 residents 
using telephone aided emergency notifications (Robin, 2008). Having learned bitter lessons from 
the 2003 San Diego fires, the safety organization set out on a mission to establish the right 
communications system.  
Unfortunately emergency calls through landlines may go unanswered, so San Diego city 
and county officials have been encouraging the residents of the area to register their mobile 
phones to make sure that no matter where they might be located, they will still receive any 
emergency notifications through their cellular phones (Dian, 2007).   
In the history of the US, the 2007 San Diego firestorms were the largest and most 
catastrophic in relation to the mass of land and property that was destroyed. Compared to 2003, 
the 2007 firestorms were fiercer in duration and intensity (Dian, 2007). However, the safety 
organizations in San Diego had previously carried out meticulous survey planning and 
preparation to mitigate any risks accruing from firestorms. Having learned the catastrophes of 
2003, the county was exceptionally prepared for the anticipated firestorms. The After Action 
Report produced after the 2003 fires had illuminated shortcomings and operational lapses in 
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containing those fires. This helped the county to make significant modifications to fire fighting 
operations. As a result, fire fighters became much better equipped to manage wild fires in future. 
The county also made changes to the OAEOC whereby plans were revised, altered and 
developed to manage emergencies (After Action Report, 2007). 
The weather and meteorological department forecasted the Santa Ana winds, creating a 
perfect scenario for wild fires to spread. Consequently, the San Diego County Office of 
Emergency Services (SDOES) worked together with the other area partners to prepare for wild 
fires (Barry, 2005). Indeed a week before the firestorms, all responsible bodies were prepared, 
awaiting the disaster in order to intervene and minimize life losses and damages to properties. 
When fires began on October 21, 2007, all the emergency systems were ready. The Harris Fire 
was the first and at the height of the firestorms, there were over seven separate fires. Although 
ten people died, 23 were injured and 89 fire fighter sustained injuries (Chris, 2008), this was a 
much better comparative outcome than 2003.  
  The most astounding factor about the whole inferno is that OAEOC managed to group 
together a huge cluster of disciplines to play their crucial role in containing the fire. These 
included Federal, State, and local departments and agencies (Robin, 2008), working together 
under the ICS, Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) and National Incident 
Management System (NIMS). Making use of technological advancements, the OAEOC 
improved greatly on its emergency and rescue structures. For instance, it made use of 
‘WebEOC’, a web based emergency management system, and Reverse 911 together with the 
AlertSanDiego, two computerized telephone delivery systems used throughout the county, for 
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disaster and evacuation notifications. In order to be more efficient and prepared for the disasters, 
OAEOC had also reorganized its staff members to create a more robust disaster response team. 
 New plans were put in place to make sure that they could help the County’s Sheriff in 
combating the ill effects associated with wild fires. The sheriff was responsible for issuing 
evacuation orders to a population of over 515,000 residents (After Action Report, 2007). This 
task was made easy at that time through the automated Reverse 911 systems alongside the 
AlertSanDiego notification system (After Action Report, 2007). The structures were so well 
prepared that the safety organization was able to coordinate the county residents through the use 
of the Reverse 911 and AlertSanDiego systems (Chris, 2008).  
 
 As the disaster progressed, the Joint Information Center (JIC) coordinated with the 
OAEOC, and 211 San Diego, together with non-profit organizations, to provide the public with 
vital emergency information. The JIC played a proactive role in keeping the public well 
informed concerning the events under way in San Diego. More than 200 press releases were sent 
out by JIC, which also collaborated with the regional partners to hold press conferences. The 
public was furnished with the vital information through media outlets and web sites such as 
www.sdcountyemergency.com. It is estimated this website received over 10 million visitors on a 
daily basis (Chris, 2008). Moreover, 211 San Diego answered approximately 109,000 calls and 
assisted with rumor control activities (Chris, 2008). A huge group of volunteers amounting to 
more than 7,000 people offered their help to the affected population (After Action Report, 2007). 
The municipal, state and federal agencies operated over 45 shelters in the county (After Action 
Report, 2007). Additionally, more than 3,000 animals were rescued, moved and temporarily 
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sheltered before being returned to their owners (After Action Report, 2007). The recovery 
process for affected individuals was soon begun at four county Local Assistance Centers (LACs). 
The LACs offered massive help to the affected people by coordinating with FEMA to provide 
over 24,000 residents with financial assistance and housing facilities (Chris, 2008).  
  By and large, San Diego County’s response to the 2007 fires was competent, effective 
and successful. Through increased vigilance, regional collaboration, preparedness plans, better 
communications system integration and the ability to adapt to the changing fire, San Diego 
County was able to respond to one of its largest fires in history. 
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C. Santa Clara County ‘Lehigh Cement Plant’ Shooting Case Study  
Describing the crime and the manhunt.  
The incident took place at the Lehigh Southwest Cement Plant at 24001 Stevens Creek 
Blvd in unincorporated Santa Clara County just outside of Cupertino. On Wednesday, October 
15, 2011 at around 4:15am, one unhappy worker, a truck driver at the Lehigh Cement Plant, 
began shooting his fellow employees (Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). This 
happened during a meeting where he felt discontent with the operations of the plant and where 
the management had not met his demands (Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). He 
then fled the scene and sometime later, five miles away, he shot a woman in the leg attempting to 
steal her car near the Hewlett-Packard campus on the east side of Cueprtino (Gomez, Webby, 
Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011).  
This incident left three people dead and seven others critically injured (Gomez, Webby, 
Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). Residents remained in danger until the following morning when 
the suspect was finally found at around 7:30 am and was killed by Santa Clara police while he 
was threatening them (Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). Of interest in this case 
study is exploring the implementation of the AlertSCC communication system during this event.  
Protection and safety measures taken: 
The endangered area had a population over 50,000, including Sunnyvale and Cupertino. 
The protection measures taken during this event were the following.  
	  Evaluating the Reverse 911 System in Santa Clara County: Does the Process Work? 
 
	  
39	  
The school district issued a warning asking parents near the areas of the two shootings to keep 
their children at home, but the warning went out late and many parents has already dropped their 
children off to schools. The Fremont Union High School District sent out emails warning people 
of the schools in the district. By 10:30 a.m. all the schools in the Fremont Union High School 
District were in lockdown. Besides schools in Cupertino, Laurelwood Elementary School in 
Santa Clara, Peterson Middle School in Sunnyvale and three Mountain View high schools where 
also closed down by school administrators. De Anza College and Saratoga High School, 
however, were not closed down, although they were close to the Lehigh cement plant, but 
according to school administrators they did not believe that the schools where in any immediate 
danger (Chang, 2011).  
Apple, which has its headquarters in Cupertino, asked its employees to stay inside their 
offices during the incident. HP, on the Cupertino campus, asked its employees not to come to 
work after the woman in the HP parking got shot and sent to the hospital. HP issued a statement 
saying, "We are in close contact with local authorities who are currently investigating the 
incident. The HP contract employee who was injured by gunfire as a result of the incident is safe 
and in stable condition at a nearby hospital." Santa Clara County sent a recorded warning 
message to residents living in the area of the manhunt who had registered with the AlertSCC 
system, and who were defined as near the area of the emergency operation. The Reverse 911 
message was sent out at 9:00 AM saying,  
“This is an important emergency message from Santa Clara County Communication 
Santa Clara County Sheriff’s Department. This message is being sent on Oct. 5th, 2011 at 
9:00am. Due to an armed subject in your neighborhood, Santa Clara County Sheriff is requesting 
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that residents in your neighborhood be on the look out for the suspect. The suspect is described 
as a black male adult, 49 years old, 5’11”, 260 pounds, black hair and brown eyes. The suspect 
also has tattoos. The suspect was last seen wearing a black baseball cap, a large brown jacket, 
and blue sweatpants. He was last seen on foot Northbound on Camtail. The suspect is associated 
with 99 brown Mercury Cooper, CA License plate: 6KTN666. If you see this suspect call 911 
and don’t approach him. Law enforcement officers are actively searching the area for this 
suspect. For information ongoing updates, please tune to local radio and television stations. This 
been a message from the Santa Clara County Communication Santa Clara County Sheriff’s 
Department and Alert SJCC. Good Bye.” This message was sent to those in communities around 
the plant. However, many residents near the area of occurrence were still not aware of what was 
happening." ’She's right in the middle of it,’ Chu fretted. ’I'm a little worried. She didn't even 
know what was going on when I called her." That was a statement from a worried mother who 
only found out about the shooter when she saw the police blockade around 8 a.m. that day 
(Newman, Fernandez, Gomez & Webby, 2011). 
Communication and notification: 
Looking at the communication tools used throughout the day of the incident, people were 
notified about the series of murders that was in the area in a number of ways. The media, to 
begin with, was at the forefront in bringing it to the people’s attention. The media served to 
inform the people about the necessary security precautions that they should take in order to keep 
safe during this dangerous incident. This, however, had little effect since most people were busy 
at that time getting to work and getting children to school, and remarkably few were keeping up 
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with the media. The media tools used included television, and radio stations. All these used 
together in notifying people on the appropriate steps to take in order to protect themselves from 
the murderer, if they were listening. 
The usage of the media however, had a number of limitations. First, it was not specific to 
the targeted area and group. Many of people who were informed were not among the affected. It 
unintentionally served to create more tension in the area rather than solve the problem. In 
addition, most of the targeted people were not reached by the notification of the media outlets, 
since this incident happened in the early hours when most people were still asleep or on their 
way to work. One example was the woman shot that day at Hewlett-Packard around 7am 
(Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). This woman was never notified of the danger 
around her, since she was just arriving at work and the alert message was not sent out to the 
public until 9:00 a.m., two hours after she was shot (Middleton, 2011).  
Evaluation:  
The update system was slow, and some residents were even released from lock down even 
though the killer was still not apprehended (Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). In 
fact, at around 5:30 pm on the first day, residents were allowed to go home from their work and 
Peterson School students were instructed to go home (Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 
2011). The main goal of mass notification was to ensure that people could avoid this danger. 
This, however¸ was not achieved as expected since the woman at HP was threatened and injured 
who might have been, instead, protected by the system if the warnings went out on time and had 
a better basis than being based on telephone zip codes of home phones. 
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Reverse 911 information system was not effectively employed during this period. 
Although many people received the alert message on their landlines and registered cell phones, 
they only got it late. The first shooting happened around 4:15 am (Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & 
Noguchi, 2011). Then, the first call, reporting the shooting, came into 911 dispatchers at 4:27am 
(Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). The Santa Clara County Communication and 
Sheriff’s Department decided to finally send an alert message at 9:00am to warn the people 
about the shooter (Middleton, 2011) because he was un-apprehended and last seen in a 
residential neighborhood on the edge of Sunnyvale and Cupertino. In other words, it had taken 
four and a half hours since the murders were committed for an alert message to be sent. So this 
notification did not reach the majority of the targeted people on time. Admittedly, the incident 
was not anticipated, nonetheless, four hours is a lot of time to wait before deciding to inform the 
endangered residents.  
In addition, many people that were not affected were also informed. The main people 
who were in danger were the workers of the cement plant and people in surrounding areas where 
the active shooter was wandering. These areas were Sunnyvale and Cupertino where people 
needed to be notified (Middleton, 2011). The system, however, informed some of the residents 
about the incident, but only those closest to the cement plant, but not near the Hewlett Packard 
shooting. Also, since the system was designed to target phones based on their zip codes, many 
people in the endangered area never received the alert since their cellphones were registered at a 
different zip code. The system was, therefore, not specific to the targeted area and group.  
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In addition, some of the targeted people were not reached by the notification of 
“AlertSCC” Reverse 911 system. One main reason is that dispatchers were challenged with a 
large geographical area (Gomez, Webby, Fernandez & Noguchi, 2011). As mentioned earlier, 
the providing company of Reverse 911 has stated in their website that this system is designed to 
cover small towns, villages and mid-sized organizations such as school campuses and 
government agencies (Cassidian Communications, 2012), whereas in the given incident, the 
endangered area had a population over 50,000; this includes Sunnyvale and Cupertino as shown 
on the following map:  
  
MAP SOURCE: NBC Bay Area News. (2011). Santa Clara shooter [Map], Retrieved October 24, 2012, from: 
http://media.nbcbayarea.com/images/shootermap.jpg 
 
Another reason is that many people in the area, were on their way to or at work at the 
time and nowhere near their home (landline) telephones. In that case, they would have needed 
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prior registration of their cell phones or office phones in order to be notified. For this reason, 
many endangered people did not receive the alert.  
 
Summary of deaths and injuries as reported by (NBC Bay area, 2011):  
Total of three people died (two died onsite while the third person died in the hospital), 
and seven were critically injured. The last reported incident was a woman shot in her leg around 
7:00 a.m. near HP campus while the shooter was trying to steal her car. Areas affected and 
incidents that took place included Quarry Shooting at Stevens Creek Blvd, carjacking at 
Homestead Road and Wolfe Road, and raid at Homestead Road and Peacock Avenue (NBC Bay 
area, 2011). 
 
 ANALYSIS   
Effectiveness of Reverse 911 System in Santa Clara County During this Event 
Reverse 911, as seen from the case studies in this paper, has a number of flaws that 
hinder its effectiveness. As has already been noted in the recent case of the Lehigh Cement 
Shooting, three people died and seven others were critically injured. To begin with, the County 
employees who were responsible for sending these alert messages were delayed in doing so. This 
was because they were waiting to receive a confirmation or an order from higher management to 
issue the alert. In that regard, they were not completely in control of the process. This protocol 
delayed information dissemination to the individuals concerned. For that reason, the message 
reached the targeted group late. The woman who was shot might have been more cautious if she 
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had received a notice, but the eastern end of Cupetino was not included in the 9 am notice, even 
after she had been shot.  
Also, even when the message was sent, it could not reach its entire targeted group 
anyway - and that could be due to a number of reasons. Some people were not in contact with 
their registered landline phones. Secondly, some people had changed their cell phone numbers 
that had previously been registered but forgot to update their new contact numbers to the system. 
Others were not registered at all. Lastly, the area selected for notification was incorrect and 
inadequate. For these reasons, reverse 911 could not be fully effective in these incidents. 
Many people do not know that mobile phones are not automatically included in the 
AlertSCC 911 database and therefore they need to register them manually. Some others do not 
favor SMS as a communication channel. Hence most of the mobile phone users are not registered 
for the service. This means that still there is a gap in the way to deal with disaster. While some of 
the people would get the emergency alerts on the mobile phones, others would overlook the 
significance of having their phones subscribed. Often, SMS cannot be remitted in huge volumes 
at one go as there are high chances the network may not be able to handle the volume (Barry, 
2005). Hence, the forwarded messages may delay and some packets may be discarded on the 
way.  
There are a number of incidences that can invoke generation and sending of Reverse 911 
messages to people in a given locality. To begin with, when there is an impending danger in a 
certain location the residents of that area are expected to receive a notification. This includes an 
anticipated danger that is likely to claim the lives of many people. Secondly, when there is a 
sudden situation in a given region, such as fire or disease outbreak, then a designated dispatcher 
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gives the system an order to send an alert with relevant information to the people in the targeted 
area (Reverse 911, 2011). 
Another main disadvantage with this system is that it is only effective when the people in 
danger all live in one geographical location. The system associates numbers to geographical 
locations, so people in different locations cannot be notified at the same time (Niles & Tennant, 
2011). Another issue is how Reverse 911 can help people ascertain the whereabouts of their 
family members during or just after a disaster, and whether this is a reasonable expectation of a 
notification system.  
Often some of the notifications remitted by Reverse 911 are misleading, as they could be 
intended for the southern part of the city but instead be remitted to the western part of the city or 
to the whole town. This information becomes irrelevant to the unaffected party and the next 
notification might not receive a serious consideration. 
Also the coverage area of the system as intended by the designers greatly limits its 
efficiency in a large county. Reverse 911 is designed for limited geographic locations such as 
small cities and villages (Cassidian, 2012). Most of the cities adopting this system are not aware 
of, or ignore, this fact until a crisis happens and people start reporting that they never received 
their alerts while their next-door neighbor did. Santa Clara County Reverse 911 covers 15 cities: 
Campbell, Cupertino, Gilroy, Los Altos, Los Altos Hills, Los Gatos, Milpitas, Monte Sereno, 
Morgan Hill, Mountain View, Palo Alto, San José, Santa Clara, Saratoga, Sunnyvale and the 
Unincorporated County (Mitchell & Anderson, 2009). Going back to the fact that this system is 
designed for small cities and villages might shed the light on an alarming issue. Would this 
system be effective in covering any one or two or even more of these cities at one time if a crisis 
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happens? As we learned from the Cement Plant case study, the answer most probably is no. In 
that case, it is strongly advised to implement as many communication tools as possible in the 
county’s emergency system and to combine them together into one organized system to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness during difficult times. The county needs a strong dependable 
emergency alerting and warning plan that is constantly tested and updated.   
Although the system has many flaws, it proved to be effective in different other incidents, 
such as during the San Diego fires in 2007. This is because it has been planned, run and 
employed effectively during these incidents. Reverse 911 was used along with other 
communication tools. It offered a platform for coordinated activities among the various 
stakeholders who are mandated to offer rescue services.  When they worked together through 
this platform, they delivered notifications within a short time, which saved lives and property. 
Through the 911 alerting system, all the agencies were able to send unified messages because 
they operated as a coordinated unit, sending their alerts to the public in general to avoid 
contradictions and misinformation. During the Lehigh factory incident, however, the system was 
not effective since there was a substantial delay in sending the message and many targeted 
people did not receive it at all, and this can be attributed to human error and the poor 
implementation of this system in the County.  
For Reverse 911 to be effective in Santa Clara County there is a need to learn from its 
effective use in San Diego County in 2007. There is also need to give more control to the 
employees responsible for sending these notifications in order to ensure speed in the event of an 
emergency. There is also need to encourage the population to constantly update their contact 
information, especially when they change their phone, home or work address. Furthermore, the 
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number of notification channels should be increased to include email, social networks (like 
Facebook and Twitter), phone push notifications, and many others, to increase the chances of the 
information reaching the right people and in good time. An informational campaign should be 
carried out to sensitize the public about the system and to strongly encourage them to register.  
All these social media tools are very cost beneficial and they can provide the same level 
of reliability, if not even better, if used side by side with Reverse 911. Eric	  Holdeman,	  the	  Director	  of	  Regional	  Disaster	  Resilience	  Center,	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  social	  media	  to	  emergency	  managers	  (Holdeman,	  2011).	  	  He	  referred,	  in	  his	  Emergency	  Management	  blog,	  to	  some	  important	  points	  made	  by	  Alexa	  Noruk,	  a	  Legislative	  Policy	  Analyst	  for	  the	  National	  Emergency	  Management	  Association	  (NEMA),	  explaining	  why	  emergency	  managers	  should	  use	  social	  media.	  	  
• Social media may not be popular with "you" but it is with the rest of the world 
• It is not just the younger generation using it [in fact Twitter has an older following] 
• You can emulate media by providing information directly to your constituents 
• It is just another tool in the tool box to use 
• The time to build a following is when there are blue skies and there is no emergency [you 
build trust in yourself and your organization] 
• You can't do this if you are not on social media yourself 
• Follow others 
• Everyone is important and you never know who you might be able to connect with 
• Social media is self-correcting and there is more correct information than incorrect 
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• You need to be the "official word" otherwise it will be an information vacuum filled by 
others (Holdeman,	  2011) 
In analyzing the AlertSCC system’s performance, the system in the discussion did not 
live up to the expectations given the massive amount of money that was spent to implement it in 
Santa Clara County. As Lynn Brown of Mountain View’s Office of Emergency Services said,  
"It just didn't rise to the level of being worth spending the money on" (Lohse, 2007). There is 
definite need to revise the implementation procedure of Reverse 911 in Santa Clara County in 
order to make it more effective when most needed. This revision should include all the proposals 
in this review. Only with this in place will the system be helpful in dealing with emergencies. 
What Else Can the County Do to Improve Its System? 
- Run toll-free test calls regularly and every time a new contact is added, or an old one updated 
or changed, make sure the owner of that number can receive it. 
- Continue to work proactively with radio, television, social media and other media outlets for 
rapid information dissemination. 
- Invest more in different media tools such as social media to advise and educate the public about 
the system and encourage them to register their devices to receive emergency alerts.  
- Cooperate with residential agencies such astitle companies, rental property managers and the 
new residents’ welcome packet group to send out flyers to current and new residents to advise 
them about the system. 
- Provide better training to employees of the dispatch center on managing the system more 
effectively. Following lessons learned from San Diego, emergency teams were well trained and 
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prepared, which lead to effectively using Reverse 911 in conjunction with other communication 
tools.  
- Use Twitter! The importance of social media in today’s communication cannot be over-
emphasized. Since the county needs to advise the people to register their cell phones to AlertSCC 
in order to be notified, they may as well advise them to join an AlertSCC Twitter account, which 
currently does not exist! However, the point is to make use of this free and effective social media 
tool called “Twitter”! It would take only five minutes to create a Twitter account for AlertSCC. 
The public needs to be aware that all different communication tools are available, and to 
encourage them to follow AlertSCC Twitter account and join AlertSCC Facebook page to stay 
notified of any updates. The same text messages sent from AlertSCC could easily and without 
effort be sent as tweets by the designated dispatcher.  
 
CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, Reverse 911 in Santa Clara County has shown, in this research, some 
major flaws, such as delay with sending alerts or not delivering those alert notifications to a 
number of endangered residents in an affected area. However, that does not mean the county has 
to get rid of Reverse 911 or implement a whole new system, unless a much more effective 
system were found. Reverse 911 did prove to be effective in other counties and cities, such as 
San Diego during the fires of 2007. Different case studies discussed in this paper showed that 
Reverse 911 is useful and effective as a tool, but the problem is mainly in the way it was 
implemented, run and managed.  
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The county should learn from the success stories and also make use of all other viable 
communication tools available - putting them together into one coherent system that connects all 
different parties involved at times of crisis. This includes all different ways of communication 
from classic methods such sirens, loudspeakers, radio and TV, as well as new technologies like 
social media and mobile push notification. As Joe Becker, a senior vice president of disaster 
services at the American Red Cross, once noted in an event held in Washington, D.C., “It's how 
we leverage the technology that people use in their daily lives to become part of the response”, 
and in that he is not saying, ”get rid of the big, proprietary systems” but instead all of these 
systems must feed into and complement each other (Ackerman, 2010). 
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